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Good morning. It is my great honor to address the Bank of Japan conference, hosted
by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. On behalf of my colleagues at the
Bank of Japan, I welcome all the distinguished guests from central banks, international
organizations, and academia.
I. The Role of Monetary Policy
When I took ofﬁce as Governor of the Bank of Japan about two months ago, I read again
Professor Milton Friedman’s well-known presidential address, “The Role of Monetary
Policy,” given at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting in 1968, recall-
ing my days as a student of Friedman’s last class at the University of Chicago. In the
address, he put the role of monetary policy this way.
The ﬁrst and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary
policy can do—and it is a lesson of the most profound importance—is that mon-
etary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of economic
disturbance ... There is therefore a positive and important task for the monetary
authority—to suggest improvements in the [monetary] machine that will reduce
the chances that it will get out of order, and to use its own powers so as to keep
the machine in good working order ... A second thing monetary policy can do is
[to] provide a stable background for the economy ... Our economic system will
work best when producers and consumers, employers and employees, can pro-
ceed with full conﬁdence that the average level of prices will behave in a known
way in the future—preferably that it will be highly stable.
1
What was intriguing here is that Friedman used the term monetary policy in a much
broader context than we deﬁne now. Nowadays, the term monetary policy is used al-
most equivalent to“interestratepolicyaiming atprice stability.”Monetary policyinthis
sense has been studied intensively and has been reﬁned both in theory and in practice.
Yetinhispresidentialaddress,Friedmanpointedtothemaintenanceofwell-functioning
of ﬁnancial markets and the system as the ﬁrst role of monetary policy, and price sta-
bility as the second role. Of course, not much would be gained here by going deeply
1. See Friedman (1968).
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man seem to strike a chord with central bankers for two reasons. First, although the
monetary policy in a conventional sense and ﬁnancial system policy are usually consid-
ered as different policy prescriptions, they become related in a complicated and delicate
manner in critical phases. Second, while policy instruments employed by a central bank
essentially aim at providing or allocating liquidity, such instruments are not earmarked
for each policy and its objective, namely, price stability or ﬁnancial system stability.
The distinction between these two policies is often not that clear.
II. Experience of the Bubble and Its Bursting
Such interrelation came to the fore during the bubble period Japan experienced since
the latter half of the 1980s. As you are all aware, Japan’s bubble was unprecedented in
moderneconomichistory:leverageexpandedandassetpricesrosesharplyandvastly.In
those circumstances, tangible investments took place that could only be justiﬁed as long
as increases in asset prices would continue forever. Once the bubble burst, a massive
amount of economically unworthy assetswereleftbehind. In other words, assetmarkets
failed in making efﬁcient intertemporal allocation of resources, which per se became
the source of economic turmoil.
The question of the relationship between monetary policy and the bubble is quite
complex and the clear answer is yet to be provided. In that regard, many economic
agents at that time had expectations that low interest rates would continue for a long
time. I cannot convincingly say that had nothing to do with the bubble formation.
Around 1988, those who argued for raising interest rates were a minority including
academia or international organizations, given the extremely subdued inﬂation rate un-
der the overheating economy. The annual growth rate of the consumer price index had
been negative until March 1987 and the annual increase was only 0.7 percent in ﬁscal
1988 as a whole. Once the bubble burst, asset prices plunged and the capital of ﬁrms
and ﬁnancial institutions rapidly eroded, thereby inﬂicting severe damage on the entire
economy. In particular, in Japan’s ﬁnancial system where banks played a predominant
role in ﬁnancial intermediations, the effects stemming from undercapitalization of the
banking sector were extremely severe. During the initial periods after the burst of the
bubble, adverse effects on the economy were brought about by a decline in demand
from a high level and the negative wealth effect stemming from the plunge in asset
prices. Subsequently, it became evident that the dominant channel was lower produc-
tivity stemming from the misallocation of resources, as a result of the malfunctioning
of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Currently, the United States and major European countries are experiencing ﬁnan-
cial turmoil in credit and funding markets. While there are some similarities between
the current turmoil in the U.S. and Japan’s experience during and after the bubble pe-
riod, there are also various differences. Let me ﬁrst point out the differences. First, the
amount of losses seems to be quite different. The losses of Japanese deposit-taking in-
stitutions during the bubble period totaled some US$1 trillion. On the other hand, in the
current ﬁnancial turmoil, the IMF estimated the worldwide loss to be approximately
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US$945 billion, of which about half was incurred by banking sector, although these
IMF estimates were based on various assumptions and thus warrant care in interpret-
ing. Second, in the United States, the losses of securitized products, which triggered the
recent turmoil, could be recognized through prices traded in the markets. In the case of
Japan, however, the losses were concentrated on non-tradable loan assets that lacked
marketability, and thus, together with drawbacks in accounting systems, led to a de-
lay in recognizing the losses. Third, in the U.S., ﬁnancial institutions that had suffered
massive losses promptly raised capitals.
There are also similarities. Arguably, the bubble was formed, expanded, and burst.
It is also common in both cases that a plunge in asset prices exerted adverse effects
on the real economy through the deterioration of the ﬁnancial side. Based on Japan’s
experience, how the negative feedback loop of tighter ﬁnancial conditions, a decline in
asset prices, and the deteriorating real economy will evolve could be key to the future
course of the economy.
III. Challenges for Monetary Policy
The recent and current episodes of ﬁnancial turmoil in the past twenty years show
that central banks face various challenges in the context of monetary policy as broadly
deﬁned by Friedman.
The ﬁrst challenge is how we should deﬁne and understand price stability which is
an objective of monetary policy. Be it in Japan or in the U.S., many of recent bubbles
occurred, quite paradoxically, following continued low interest rate period after price
stability was achieved or deﬂation scare heightened. While how a decline in inﬂation
or low interest rates relate to aggressive risk-taking by economic agents is yet to be
clariﬁed, the experience of the bubble and its burst tell us that the economy sometimes
respond in a nonlinear manner. During such a nonlinear process, complicated dynamics
such as the feedback loop between the real and ﬁnancial side of the economy play a de-
cisive role. In other words, the ﬁrst and the second role of monetary policy as identiﬁed
by Friedman are closely related to each other. While policymakers and economists un-
derstand that price stability represents a situation in which prices could remain stable in
a medium to long term, inﬂation dynamics could evolve with a long lag and accompany
nonlineareffects.Againstsuchabackdrop,ifwefocusnarrowlyonthecurrentobserved
inﬂation rate, there is a risk that necessary monetary policy adjustments might be de-
layed, inducing large ﬂuctuations in economic activities. In that regard, central banks
around the globe seem to strive for exploring optimal ways to communicate a quanti-
tative expression of price stability with different consequences. Central banks under an
inﬂation targeting regime announce the target level of inﬂation rate. The Bank of Japan
and the European Central Bank (ECB) announce some kind of numerical deﬁnition of
price stability, while the Federal Reserve provides a medium-term forecasted value of
inﬂation given the current economic conditions and appropriate policy.
The second challenge is how to design ﬁnancial system policy. Although we can
recognize a risk of a nonlinear change of the economy such as the burst of the bubble,
we cannot take preemptive monetary easing before a bubble burst. It is impossible to
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appropriate to cut the policy interest rate more than the standard Taylor rule suggests, as
with the current policy by the Fed. At the same time, the Japaneseexperience shows that
itisquitedifﬁcultto createsufﬁcientlybenign ﬁnancialconditions only withareduction
in the policy interest rate when the balance sheets of ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions are
severely devastated. When looking at the current U.S. ﬁnancial situation, the yields of
corporate bonds with low credit standings have not been reduced yet compared with the
level in summer 2007, despite the massive decrease in the policy rate. The fact suggests
that in addition to the policy interest rate changes ex post, it is important to design a pol-
icy and institutional framework less prone to the formation of a bubble ex ante. While
I have already mentioned possible measures in terms of monetary policy, how to align
supervision and regulations remains an important challenge that needs to be addressed,
so as not to let ﬁnancial institutions’ behaviors amplify economic ﬂuctuations.
The third challenge is the so-called banking policy of central banks. For effective
monetary policy, stable ﬁnancial system and well-functioning ﬁnancial markets are in-
dispensable. The events since summer 2007 have highlighted that the loss of market
liquidity has played a crucial role. Although the mechanism of drying up market liq-
uidity has not yet been fully investigated, central banks have been making efforts to
restore market liquidity by means of their own banking functions. In that regard, the
Bank of Japan has shown itself to be at the frontiers. For example, in 2001 it introduced
a new method of liquidity provision with relatively longer maturities to a wider range of
ﬁnancial institutions. This is equivalent to the Term Auction Facility (TAF) introduced
by the Fed in December 2007. In 2001, the Bank of Japan introduced a standing facility
to ﬁnancial institutions including securities companies.
2 It corresponds to the Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) introduced by the Fed in March 2008. In addition, the
Bank of Japan carried out a twist operation—a mixture of liquidity provision and is-
suance of bills sold, where a central bank acts as a kind of broker in the money market.
Furthermore, it purchased asset-backed securities, and purchased stocks held by banks.
All those measures were policy prescriptions aimed at revitalizing the functioning of ﬁ-
nancial markets and ﬁnancial system. Although they would not usually be classiﬁed as
monetary policy measures, the effects of monetary policy cannot be evaluated without
considering the banking policy conducted by a central bank. In the changing ﬁnancial
environment, central banks are bound to continuously review their operations.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The challenges I have described are very practical for central banks. While they are all
quite difﬁcult ones for central banks to tackle, central banks should conduct their policy
by ﬁnding the answers to them one by one. In such a process, central banks make the
most of available academic wisdom. Central banks often face situations unexplained by
existing theories. For that very reason, I believe that central banks must be ever learning
institutions. At the same time, we should make efforts to convey to academia whatever
2. As for the actions taken in 2001, see Bank of Japan, Open Market Operations Division (2001, 2002).
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puzzles we have found in practice. In turn, the theories developed in academic circles
would ﬁnd their way to be fed back to central bank circles as valuable input for the
proper conduct of monetary policy.
I am convinced that candid and inspiring discussions in various aspects of monetary
policywilltakeplaceatthisconference,thatthediscussionswillbeappliedtothefuture
policy implementation among central banks, and that the nexus between practice and
theory will push back the academic frontiers furthermore.
Thank you for your attention, and I wish you a big success of the conference.
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